Abstract This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case study illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985.
K0 All substitution instances of classical tautologies
It is complete for frames of the form (S, R, a) where S = ∅ is a set of possible worlds, a ∈ S, R ⊆ S × S and ∀x∃y(x Ry).
Standard Deontic Logic SDL is a KD modality O. We read u Op as saying p holds in all ideal worlds relative to u, i.e. ∀t (u Rt ⇒ t p). So the set of ideal worlds relative to u is the set
The D condition says
Following Jones and Pörn (1985) , let us quickly review some of the difficulties facing SDL in formalizing certain examples.
These difficulties are referred to as paradoxes because people believe they should not hold. The paradoxes are as follows, see Chisholm (1963) , Ross (1941) , Prior (1958) , Aqvist (1965) .
The Chisholm paradox
Consider the following statements:
1. It ought to be that a certain man go to the assistance of his neighbour. 2. It ought to be that if he does go he tell them he is coming. 3. If he does not go then he ought not to tell them he is coming. 4. He does not go.
It is agreed that intuitively (1)-(4) of Chisholm are consistent and totally independent of each other. Therefore it is expected that their formal translation into logic SDL should retain these properties.
Let us semantically write the Chisholm set in semiformal English, with p and q as follows, p means help and q means tell.
We intuitively accept that (1)-(4) are consistent and logically independent of eachother. Also we accept that (3) and (4) imply (7), and that (2) and (5) imply (6). Note that some authors would also intuitively expect to conclude (6) from (1) and (2). Now suppose we offer a logical system L and a translation τ of (1), (2), (3), (4) of Chisholm into L.
For example L could be Standard Deontic Logic or L could be a modal logic with a dyadic modality O(X/Y ) (X is obligatory in the context of Y ).
We now list coherence conditions for the translation τ and for L. We expect the following to hold.
(a) "Obligatory X " is translated the same way in (1), (2) and (3). Say τ (Obligatory X ) = ϕ(X ). (b) (2) and (3) are translated the same way, i.e., we translate the form:
(23): X → Obligatory Y to be ψ(X, Y ) and the translation does not depend on the fact that we have (4) ¬ p as opposed to (5) p. (1)- (4) remain independent in L and retain the connections that the translations of (2) and (5) imply the translation of (6), and the translations of (3) and (4) imply the translation of (7). (e) the translated system maintains its properties under reasonable substitution in L.
Furthermore, we might, but not necessarily, expect ψ(X/ ) = ϕ(X ). (c) if X is translated as τ (X ) then (4) is translated as ¬τ (X ), the form (23) is translated as ψ(τ (X), τ (Y )) and (1) is translated as ϕ(τ (X )). (d) the translations of
The notion of reasonable substitution is a tricky one. Let us say for the time being that if we offer a solution for one paradox, say 1 ( p, q, r, . . .) and by substitution for p, q, r, . . . we can get another well known paradox 2 , then we would like to have a solution for 2 . This is a reasonable expectation from mathematical reasoning. We give a general solution to a general problem which yields specific solutions to specific problems which can be obtained from the general problem. (f) the translation is essentially linguistically uniform and can be done item by item in a uniform way depending on parameters derived from the entire database. To explain what we mean consider in classical logic the set
To translate it into disjunctive normal form we need to know the number of atoms to be used. Item (1) is already in normal form in the language of { p} but in the language of { p, q} its normal form is ( p ∧ q) ∨ ( p ∧ ¬q). If we had another item (3) r then the normal form of p in the language of { p, q, r } would be
The moral of the story is that although the translation of (1) is uniform algorithmically, we need to know what other items are in the database to set some parameters for the algorithm.
Jones and Pörn, for example, examine in Jones and Pörn (1985) possible translations of the Chisholm (1)-(4) into SDL. They make the following points:
(1) If we translate according to, what they call, option a: then we get back consistency but lose independence, since (1a) implies (3b). (4) Further, if we want (2) and (5) to imply (6), and (3) and (4) to imply (7) then we cannot use (3b) and (2a).
The translation of the Chisholm set is a "paradox" because known translations into Standard Deontic Logic (the logic with O only) are either inconsistent or dependent.
The Good Samaritan paradox
The validity of
O( p ∧ q) → Oq
in SDL causes problems.
The Ross paradox
These are "paradoxes" because they should not hold.
Example for Ross paradox
• A ought to post the letter → A ought to post the letter or burn it.
Example for good Samaritan paradox
• A ought to help B who has been robbed → B ought to have been robbed.
The fence paradox
Compare with items (1)-(4) of the Chisholm paradox.
The sentences are uttered now, at time u. The first sentence implies that the party was in the past, and so it is too late. The second implies the party is still in the future and so his coming is in the future. If we evaluate the sentence at u = now, we need to go back to some s in the past of u (write s < u) and evaluate there the sentence (*3) He will come to the party.
However, if we do not remember the point u we cannot tell the difference between (*1) and (*2). So we are forced to have two indices.
• (u, u) past A iff for some s, s < u and (u, s) A.
• (u, s), with u < s will A iff for some s , u < s we have (u, s ) A.
• (u, s) with u < s would A iff for some s , s < s < u we have (u, s ) A.
The so-called English future perfect is similar (*4) When the police arrive at his home, (i.e. will arrive) John will have left the country.
We need the following truth tables:
• (u, u) will A iff for some s, u < s and (u, s) A.
For more details and examples, see Gabbay (1976a) .
Axioms for 2SDL
We now give a formal definition of a two dimensional version of SDL, which we call 2SDL.
Definition 2.1 (2SDL defined semantically) Consider a modal language with two modalities, Oq and Y q.
A model for the language has the form (S, R, h)
where R is a binary relation on S satisfying the conditions below and h is an assignment giving for each atom q a subset h(q) ⊆ S. The conditions on R are the following: 
Note. Groups (1)-(3) are closed under substitution, but not Group 4.
Remark 2.3 2 dimensional logic arose in the logical analysis of the tenses of English. Reichenbach (1947, Section 51 , The tenses of verbs) gave a three-dimensional logic for analysing verbs. 3 2 Note that this means that Standard Deontic Logic SDL with is a sub-logic of 2SDL under the identification OY as . 3 Segerberg (1973) in his paper on two dimensional logic includes the following historical passage
The history of the ideas expressed in the preceding paragraphs is not clear to the author. First to study operators of type 0 were probably Hans Kamp and A. N. Prior; our discussion of tomorrow was inspired by their treatment of now in Kamp (1971) and Prior (1968) . Also of interest in this connection is David Lewis's discussion of actual in Lewis (1970) . As far as the author knows, the more complicated operator 0 is new with Aqvist. However, it is worth quoting the anonymous referee who remarked on the penultimate version of this paper that "insofar as there is any one inventor of two dimensional modal logic, it is Frank Vlach". When Vlach's U.C.L.A. thesis becomes available it will be possible to evaluate this claim.
We claim that the anonymous referee mentioned by Segerberg is wrong. D. Gabbay in his 1974 paper, uses three dimensional Logic extensively to model the uses of the tenses in English and credits Reichenbach 1947 for the idea. By the way, while we are dealing with historical priority, we mention that Gabbay had already semantically introduced the now operator in 1970 but not developed proof theory for it, as Hans Kamp did. All this material is also published in Gabbay's (1976b) book.
Addressing the Chisholm paradox
We now give a translation of the Chisholm paradox into 2SDL.
We begin with a few words about our approach.
a. We believe that Jones and Pörn are right when they say in their seminal paper of 1985 that (see Sect. 3.1 below):
SDL …fails to do justice to the equally reasonable conception that obligations are violable or may fail to be realised.
Jones and Pörn introduce ideal worlds as well as sub-ideal worlds. They can realise violations in the sub-ideal worlds. We use the Rantala constant r (see Jones and Pörn 1986, p. 93 and Remark 3.4 below) , in this paper to divide the accessible worlds which are ideal (r holds) from those which are sub-ideal (¬r holds). However, the use of r can be conceptually eliminated if we regard all obligations as contrary to duties. We shall address this later, see Remark 2.5. We are now ready to introduce our first translation. b. We believe another observation needs to be taken into account, something Jones and Pörn have not addressed, and that is the fact that the context of the obligation (formally the possible world in which the obligation is activated) and the context of the result of the Contrary to Duty (formally the possible world in which the contrary to duty obligation is detached and is activated) are different. The result of the Contrary to Duty is after or at the same time as the violation while the context of the original obligation is before the violation and possibly also after the violation. 4 For these distinctions we need the two dimensional logic, because it allows us to manipulate an additional index for context.
We now say a few words about our methodology. We decided to write this paper using methods and ideas available in the literature before 1985, which is the year Jones and Pörn published their seminal paper. So anyone at that date could have conceivably written the present paper. Everything used was available then. Using today's methods, such as reactive semantics or preferential semantics, we can give other solutions, see for example Gabbay (2008b) , van der Torre and Tan (1999), Gabbay (2011) and Gabbay (2010) .
We are now ready to introduce our first translation. We can have a traditional SDL approach and translate Obligator y x using Y Ox of the system. We shall see that in this case we have none of the difficulties mentioned in Sect. 1, because we take advantage of the two dimensions in 2SDL.
(1) We augment 2SDL with a propositional constant called the Rantala constant r.
We add the axiom
u, the set of worlds I (u) = {x | u Rx} is divided by this axioms into two nonempty parts: The more preferred worlds x | r and the less preferred worlds x | ¬r. When Obligator y A holds at u, we want it to hold in all the more preferred worlds. The predecessor function can be viewed as generating the preference. The Rantala constant is similar to the proposition constant Q, interpreted as the negation of the Andersonian sanction S and due to Kanger (1971) . For "Q", read "all (relevant) normative demands are met". (2) We translate the linguistic "Obligator y x" as
(3) We translate the linguistic Conditional Obligation Structure COS "z → Obligator y y" as
The reason why the constant r is needed will become clear in a moment. Note that, strictly speaking, given the constant r , the obligation operation O appearing in the above two definienta might equally be replaced with the operator.
If O is replaced with , we get a two-dimensional variant to the well-known Andersonian-Kangerian reduction, to the effect that "x is obligatory" means the same as "necessarily r implies x". The use of in place of O makes much sense, because strictly speaking the accessibility relation associated with our O has no deontic flavor. It is the presence or absence of r in a state that tells us whether or not the latter one is good or bad. Throughout the rest of the paper, we will nevertheless stick to the O-notation. (4) We translate the factual linguistic p " f actual p" as
Thus the Chisholm paradox is translated as 5 5 Note that we have uniformity of translation in the sense that the combination connective A = de f. Y O A is used in the translation. We have
We can thus view the fragment with as the new variant of SDL. Some readers may feel more comfortable with as it is closer to linguistic use. Let us write the semantics for directly. We start with a general model the form (S, R, u, e, h), Where (S, R, u, h ) is a KD model, and e is a function giving for each point t in S another point e(t) such that e(t)Rt holds. When the model is a tree like in Definition 2.1 and e(t) is the unique predecessor of t, we do not get anything new, we get back the modality Y O. However we can look at the general model, a model in which (S, R, u) is not necessarily a tree and e is not necessarily a predecessor function, then the truth table for is:
A iff for all u such that s Ru, we have (s, u) | A, where s is the point e(t) in the general model and the unique predecessor of t in the tree model. 
The Forrester and the fence paradoxes are obtained as a special case of the Chisholm paradox by taking ¬q = ¬p ∧ w.
We now explain the nature of our translation into 2SDL. Consider Fig. 1 . The four points depicted in Fig. 1 satisfy u Rt, u Rx, u Rs. We also have s | r, meaning that s is an ideal world. t is not an ideal world. x is the world where our linguistic Chisholm set is evaluated. Thus all translations of the items of Chisholm hold at x. The figure does not indicate whether x is an ideal (x | r) or a non ideal world (x | ¬r). This depends on item 1 (the obligation) and its relation to item 4 of Chisholm. In our case the obligation is for p and the fact is ¬ p. So x must be a non ideal world and so ¬r holds at x.
We could have translated fact p as: If p obeys the obligation in (1) of Chisholm then take x to be an ideal world. and If p does not obey the obligation (1) then take x to be non ideal world. 6 Now we turn to (1), (2) and (3) .
All obligations are evaluated at point u. So at u we tell what is Obligator y. We translate Obligator y p as
This is a traditional SDL obligation, namely p must hold in all ideal worlds. Since our starting point is the world x, we must write
Now let us ask ourselves what do we get if we require e(t) = t? Do we get the Jones and Pörn semantics to be introduced in the beginning of Sect. 3? 6 However if we want to give a translation of (4) independent of what (1) is, we take any x 1 and translate (4) as
This will go to u (because of Y ) and go again (because of PY ) to some x 2 | ¬ p. If the obligation in (1) is p then x 2 will be non ideal and if the obligation in (1) is ¬ p, then x 2 will be ideal. The choice will be made automatically by the operators Y PY . Note also that we have the axiom ¬ p → Y PY ¬ p and this confirms our translation of (4).
to send all the obligation from x to u. Now the Contrary to Duty, say ¬ p → Obligator y ¬q must hold at worlds like x, where the violation occurs. We want to do factual detachment at x x | ¬ p x | ¬ p → Obligator y ¬q and get x | Obligator y ¬q.
But we agreed that all obligations and contrary to duties are given at u. So again we write
which implies x | ¬ p → Ob¬q and now we get x | Ob¬q and since for the case of
So far so good. We have one problem. Since item (1) of Chisholm is Ob p, we get under this translation u | O(r → p) from (1) and u | O(r → ¬q) from (3) and so at t we get t | p ∧ ¬q. So p ∧ ¬q must be consistent, which is not in line with the independence of p and q.
The problem is that to keep uniformity of translation we must translate Obligation A in items (1), (2) and (3) of Chisholm all uniformly the same way! Our solution is to move to two dimensional logic. Let us evaluate again. We number the lines below for cross reference.
We now evaluate the COS also at x
Here comes the two dimensional trick.
To summarize:
• The Ob p is at (u, u).
• The COS result of the (x, x) violation ¬ p gives you the Ob¬q at (x, x).
• We have consistency as well as the Contrary to Duty obligation detached at the place of violation!
The reason why the constant r is needed should be obvious to the reader. Suppose the linguistic "obligatory x" is rendered, not as Jones and Pörn (1986, p. 9) , but as Obx = Y Ox. It is not difficult to see that the conjunction Ob p ∧ ¬p is inconsistent. Thus, if this simpler definition is used, the Chisholm set remains inconsistent. Loewer and Belzer (1983) , it is customary to distinguish between two families of deontic logic depending on the kind of detachment principles they support. One supports the factual detachment principle (FD): from A and the conditional obligation of B given A, infer the unconditional obligation of B. The other supports the deontic detachment principle (DD): from the obligation of A and the conditional obligation of B given A infer the unconditional obligation of B. The Chisholm set generates an inconsistency, only because SDL has the two principles. Based on this observation some suggested getting rid of the paradox by just abandoning one of the two rules. However, it was very early acknowledged that this is not satisfactory, as both rules have intuitive support. The main point of Jones and Pörn-and we think their main contribution-was to show that we can have them both without running into the Chisholm problem. In their system factual detachment yields the actual obligation to do q, while deontic detachment yields the ideal obligation to do ¬q. Both conclusions can co-exist, since "ought" is not used in the same sense in both (p. 284 and 5 of Jones and Pörn's (1985) paper). In fact there are alternative ways to make them coexist. Some were proposed and studied before 1985. One such is the temporal logic approach of Aqvist (1966) . The abstract of this paper presents the work done in the paper as an attempt to recast the Jones and Pörn's system into the language of two-dimensional logic. The perceptive reader would expect an explanation of how the two-dimensional logic tackles the aforementioned issue. We have just explained that a form of factual detachment is possible in two-dimensional logic: from ¬ p at (x, x) and COS(¬ p, ¬q) at (x, x) one might infer that Ob ¬q holds at (x, x). The reference and the evaluation points are the same x, where the violation of the primary obligation to do ¬ p occurs. Given that I am in a violation context, my actual obligation is to do ¬q. The effect of the contrary-to-duty obligation on my actual obligations is not so much "after" the violation, but rather at the same time as it. This corresponds to the derivation of the actual obligation "Ought ¬q" in the Jones and Pörn system, (p. 284 of their paper). We now observe that a form of deontic detachment is also possible. There might be different ways to put it. One is to say that from Ob p at (x, x) and COS ( p, q) at (x, x) one might infer that r → Ob q holds at (u, x) , where u is the unique predecessor of x. At u the violation has not occurred yet. This is the moment "before the violation" our sentence above refers to. The sentence "r → Ob q holds at (u, x)" and the sentence "Ob ¬q holds at (x, x)" do not conflict. From one sentence to the other, the evaluation point remains the same, x. But the reference point has changed. The second sentence reports an obligation that holds with reference to the sub-ideal situation x, and the first reports an obligation that holds with reference to the ideal situation u where the primary obligation is not violated. The derivation of r → Ob q at (u, x) corresponds to the derivation of "O Oughtq" in the Jones and Pörn system, (p. 285 of their paper). There they refer to it as an "ideal" obligation, meaning (something like) that it is the (actual) obligation I would have if I had not violated the primary obligation. So the obligation in question is, in some sense or other, "still there". In our formalism, r → Ob q makes the coming in force of Ob q in word x depends on the truth of r , and r is false at x. The implication says: had r be the case, and x been a good state, the actual obligation would be to do q. This is the key of the two-dimensional solution of the Chisholm paradox.
Remark 2.4 Following
The above translation Ob is good to solve the Chisholm , the Forrester paradoxes and the Pragmatic Oddity, but it still allows for the rules
To avoid this we can take a different Ob, a strong Ob:
We can also take what is basically the Jones and Pörn translation (1)
We shall critically analyse the Jones and Pörn system in the next section. It is instructive to see how the model works for several COSs Remark 2.5 We mentioned earlier that we want to regard every obligation as a contrary to duty obligation. To see how this is done, consider the fence example again:
1. There ought to be no fence 2. (We are not dealing with this item here) 3. If there is a fence, it should be white.
We read (1) as obligation and (3) as COS and translated 1. YO(r → ¬ f ence) 3. YO(fence → YO(r → white fence)) r was supposed to give us the ideal worlds and ¬r the subideal worlds.
Let us read r slightly differently. u r means u is a world where we want the obligation to hold. u ¬r means u is a world where we do not necessarily expect the obligation to hold.
We can rewrite (3) as (3 ) (3 ) YO(fence → YO(fence → white fence)) and we can write (1) as (1 ) (
The reason we have YYO in (1 ) and not just YO, is because the obligation of ¬fence holds at (u, u) and if we regard this obligation as being the result of a Contrary to Duty to some corresponding previous obligation, then the Contrary to Duty itself and the corresponding previous obligation must hold at the predecessor of u. Let v be the predecessor of u, i.e. v Ru holds, then we must have
and (u, u) r which together yield (u, u) O(r → ¬ fence). The obvious corresponding previous obligation is (v, v) Obligatory ¬r. This presents (1) as a contrary to duty to some obligation ¬r holding at v. So each contary to duty has its own r.
We thus get complete uniformity in presentation, and we abandon the notion of ideal world.
This has some further advantages 1. COS obligations are not in ideal world but in violation/compliance worlds. 2. We can easily model a chain of embedded COSs 3. In our language, we can specify explicitly how far into the COS chain an obligation is to be enforced. 4. Primary obligations Obx at points u can still be identified as COS relative to ¬r, where ¬r can be interpreted to be an obligation holding at the predecessor of u. The COS says that if you do the contrary r then Obx kicks in as a COS.
Let us consider an example. We use the following denotation:
f : there is a fence h: there is a high fence l: there is a low fence Intuitively, we want to ensure that in all dog-worlds we get Ob f and Ob h (because Ob l comes from a contrary to duty to having a fence which is itself a contrary to duty to having a dog while Obh is according to duty to having a fence as a result of having a dog. So Obl follows two violations while Obh follows only one violation) but cannot derive Ob l. Note that the rendering
instead of the more simple and equally workable
was only imposed by the idea that we would want to derive Ob ψ but now not relative to r but ψ, e.g.
and then we get this:
This still follows our intuitions with the example being verified in 2SDL, not if we start with a dog and a fence fact(d ∧ f ), but also works if we start with fact(d) and fact( f ).
We make the translation. Text in English:
Translation in 2SDL (see Fig. 2 ): 
Derivations from the translated text:
because d is atomic and therefore its value at any (t, w)
depends only on w. 
Completeness theorems for 2SDL
We now turn to a sequence of definitions and lemmas leading to a completeness proof for 2SDL.
Given a model (S, R, u, h) , evaluation can be done at a pair of points (t, s) ∈ S × S. Since we always start the evaluation at (u, u) , an examination of the satisfaction conditions of Definition 2.1 reveals that only pairs (t, s) are involved which satisfy the following two conditions: We have:
If we know that t R n s holds i.e., that s is at a distance n + 1 from t, then we can identify
The Henkin method of construction allows us to build models out of complete theories. So how can we construct the set of theorems which gives us the model? Any complete and consistent theory of the logic will have the form of t,t for some t. Suppose we start with such a theory , and let us say it is u,u , for an index u. We shall construct all the needed theories u,s , for all possible s such that u R n s. From each u,s we can extract s,s . We need not worry about u,u because we know it and for each s we know its "distance" from u. Once we have recursively done this again and again for each s,s we get, we will have a complete Henkin model. So let us begin our series of definitions and lemmas. Definition 2.14 We now construct a model for each complete theory . We define a set of labels S and a binary relation R on S and form a model (S, R, u, h) and we further define a partial function f on S × S giving a theory t,s for some of the pairs of points (t, s) ∈ S × S such that t R n s holds. Note that the relation R is between points in S, and that we further define a relation R such that the relation R is between theories associated with such points.
We say f gives values to some of the pairs, because we are interested only in reachable  pairs (t, s) . What do we mean by reachable? When we evaluate a formula at (u, u), (u is the actual world of (S, R, u, h) ), then in the course we need to evaluate sub-formulas at all kinds of pairs (t, s). Such pairs are reachable from (u, u) .
During the construction of the model we will also say when a pair (t, s) is reachable. What is not reachable from (u, u) does not affect the evaluation of wffs at (u, u) .
Let a complete and consistent 2SDL theory be given. We want to construct a model with (u, u) | .
Step 1. Let u ∈ S and let f(u, u) = . We say (u, u) is reachable.
Step (n + 1, 1). Assume the point x ∈ S was put into S at step n and assume f(x, x) = . Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . list all wffs of the language. For each PA i ∈ construct the theory 2 ( , P A i ) as in Lemma 2.9 and the theory Y 2 ( , PA i ). Introduce into S a completely new symbol y(x, i) (x is the node we are dealing with, i is for PA i ), and extend the function f as follows
Stipulate that x Ry(x, i) holds. Say y(x, i) was introduced into S at step (n + 1, 1).
Also say that (x, y(x, i)) and (y(x, i), y(x, i)) are reachable from (u, u). Also construct at this step (n + 1, 1) a new point y(x), with y(x)Rx and with f(y(x), y(x)) = Y . We also say that (y(x), y(x)) is reachable from (u, u).
Step (n+1, m +1). Assume that in step (n+1, m) we introduced new symbols into S of the form y( y(x, e 1 , . . . , e m , j) ). Say that all of these y(x, e 1 , . . . , e m , j) were put in S in Step(n + 1, m + 1).
Step (n + 1). We say a point z was put in S in Step(n + 1) if for some m, z was put in S in Step(n + 1, m).
Let S be the set of all points put in S at some step n. R was defined for these points, we thus get a frame (S, R, u) . To define h, let z | q iff q ∈ f(z, z). We now prove Lemma 2.15.
Lemma 2.15 In the model of Definition 2.14 we have for t, s such that t R n s and the pair (t, s) is reachable from (u, u) that • (t, s) | A iff A ∈ f(t, s).

Note that because (t, s) is reachable f is defined on (t, s).
Proof By induction on A.
(1) The case of atomic q and the cases of the classical connectives are immediate. 
For the atomic case, note that the truth condition for atoms is (t, s) | q iff (s, s) | q and so because of the axiom O n (q ↔ Y q) we get that q ∈ f(t, s) iff q ∈ f(s, s). (2) Consider the case of (t, s) | P
. , e m )).
A similar argument applies for the case of t = s. In this case we look at
(f(t, t), PA e 1 ). (3) Consider now (t, s) | Y E for the case t different from s. If Y E ∈ f(t, s) then by construction E ∈ f(t, s) Y = f(s, s) and hence (s, s) | E, and therefore (t, s) Y E. If (t, s) Y E then (s, s) E and then E ∈ f(t, s) Y by the induction hypothesis and hence by construction Y E ∈ f(t, s).
In case t = s, then the predecessor point y(t)Rt is in S with f(y(t), y(t)) = f(t, t) Y and by the induction hypothesis we get the result.
To conclude the completeness proof, let be a consistent and complete theory. Construct a model with f(u, u) = , our Lemma applies and all A ∈ hold in the model.
Theorem 2.16 2SDL has the finite model property.
Proof We use Gabbay's Method of selective filtration Gabbay (1970) . Let be a finite theory closed under sub-formulas and let (S, R, u, h) be a model for . We select a finite S ⊆ S to be a model for . Let n be the maximal number of nested {P, Y } operators appearing in .
Put y i (u) in S and say that y i (u) were put at S at step 1. Also put in the predecessor
. Consider all points s put in S at step k − 1. Look at all wffs of the form
at pairs (t, s) or (s, t) such that t R i s or s R i t or t = s for some i (i is always ≤ l). Check which P A i , Y A i hold at (t, s) or (s, t) or (s, s) and add the necessary points. y i (s) or y i (t) or y Y (s) or y Y (t).
At step n stop.
Lemma 2.17 Let (t, s), for t = s or t R i s, be a pair of points introduced at step k or before. Let A be a wff with at most n − k maximal nested modalities {P, Y }. Then ( * ) (t, s) | A in S iff (t, s) | A in S.
Proof ( * ) holds for atomic q and for the classical connectives. So it works for k = n. We assume it holds for k and show it holds for k + 1, (t, s) | PA in S then for some point s , s Rs and (t, s) | A in S. By induction hypothesis the complexity of A is one less i.e., n − k − 1 and s was put at step k + 1 so (t, s ) | A in S by the induction hypothesis, and so (t, s ) | P A in S.
Assume (t, s) | PA in S. By construction, a point s such that s Rs and (t, s ) | A in S was put at S at stage k. Then by induction (t, s ) | A in S and so (t, s) | PA. A similar argument applies to the case of Y .
Theorem 2.18 2SDL is decidable.
Proof 2SDL is decidable because it is recursively axiomatisable and has the finite model property. The following holds:
The KD modality O on its own is standard deontic logic SDL.
Therefore the worlds t such that u R O t are considered ideal worlds relative to u.
The worlds s such that u R O s are considered subideal worlds relative to u. The condition (DLb) says a world cannot be both ideal and subideal relative to the same u.
Condition (DLa) says any world is either ideal or subideal to itself. 10 Let Px ≡ ¬O¬x, P x ≡ ¬O ¬x.
Jones and Pörn define a new "Ought" as:
The aim of Jones and Pörn is to avoid the Chisholm paradox, see Chisholm (1963) , and the Ross paradox and the Good Samaritan paradox.
In their 1985 paper Jones and Pörn translate Chisholm as follows, using O, O . The numbering is as in their paper: They offer several possible translations a, b, c for each of (1)- (4) of Chisholm. They discuss the possibilities at length and eventually adopt the list below. Recall that their "ought" is
They claim their system avoids the Chisholm, Ross and Good Samaritan paradoxes. 11 Hansson (1989) showed that the following still holds in Jones and Pörn systems:
He claims these are still paradoxical.
For example
• If I ought to mail a letter but in fact I neither mail it nor burn it, then I ought to mail it or burn it. Jones and Pörn (1989) reply to Hansson essentially saying that they are not claiming to solve all paradoxes, they admit there are still difficulties.
What Jones and Pörn say about DL
Let us gain some perspective by quoting what Andrew Jones says about DL and its achievements, in Jones (1993) , and see also Jones and Pörn (1991) and Jones and Pörn (1986) . Jones and Pörn (1986) say
There are some good reasons for extending SDL. First, in the usual applications of SDL Ought is identified with O, Op is read "It ought to be the case that p" or "It is obligatory that p". This identification captures the intuition that obligations are realizable, but it fails to do justice to the equally reasonable conception that obligations are violable or may fail to be realized. When a set of norms states or implies that it is obligatory that p, it very often also supplies a norm determining an obligation for the situation in which the obligation that p is violated-a contrary-to-duty obligation, as Chisholm would call it. Ought is thus subject to the condition that the proposition it governs be contingent in some sense; but the identification of Ought with O runs counter to this requirement, since it makes tautologies obligatory as a matter of logic and thus admits nonviolable obligations. Secondly, it is hard to see how the deontic modality Must should be construed in SDL, and how its relation to Ought is to be exhibited using the resources of SDL. The same point may be made in regard to a number of other distinctions and qualifications in the field of obligations, for example those that are made when one speaks of ideal, prima-facie, actual, absolute, or defeasible obligations. The final reason -not unconnected with those given above -is that a number of paradoxes may be generated within SDL, for example Ross's Paradox and Chisholm's Paradox; their existence has often been taken as sufficient warrant for departing from SDL -justifiably, in our opinion.
We quote from Andrew Jones' own words in Jones (1993) , and see also Jones and Pörn (1991) In common with many other recent works in deontic logic, the approach in Jones and Pörn (1985) and Jones and Pörn (1986) took its point of departure in a criticism of standard deontic logic (SDL), which is a normal modal system of the type KD according to the Chellas classification (Chellas 1980) . The system DL, presented in Jones and Pörn (1985) and Jones and Pörn (1986) , was an extension of SDL; its construction was guided by the following hypothesis: that the main reason for the inadequacy of SDL derives from the fact that its O-operator can be used only for describing deontically ideal versions of a given world -what obtains in sub-ideal versions lies beyond its powers of description. and later on he says
In DL, we met the requirements of consistency and logical independence, and satisfied the detachment properties, by adopting the view that if a sentence of type "If A then it ought to be that B" is true at a given world u, then it expresses a constraint which holds at all the worlds deontically accessible to u: at all of the ideal versions, and at all of the sub-ideal versions, of u. We took the "core" of a sentence of type "If A then it ought to be that B" to be expressed by the material conditional "A → OughtB", but also proposed that this "core" itself had the modal status of deontic necessity, as expressed by our ND operator. Furthermore, despite the difference in surface form between the English conditional sentences CH2 and CH3, we found no good reason for supposing that they exhibit conditional structures of fundamentally distinct logical forms. In keeping with these guidelines and assumptions, we then represented the Chisholm set as:
This set is logically consistent and its members logically independent of each other. Since ND is a success operator, in the sense that (vii) is valid, then of course CH5* Ought ¬B follows from lines CH3* and CH4*. In addition, by the definitions of the Ought and No operators, and by elementary properties of the logic of the O operator, CH6* O Ought B may be deduced from CHI* and CH2*. These two results captured the intuition that, in the circumstances, the agent's actual obligation was to do ¬B, whereas, under ideal circumstances, his obligation was to do B. We had the further, highly satisfactory, result that if CH4* were replaced by ∼CH4* A, then CH2* and CH4* would yield CH7* OughtB, whilst CH6* was of course still forthcoming from CH1* and CH2*. This is intuitively satisfactory, because in the situation in which we have compliance to, rather than violation of, the obligation expressed in the first line, it is to be expected that what may be deduced as regards the agent's actual obligation (as expressed by CH7*) should be in harmony with what may be deduced regarding his ideal obligation (as expressed by CH6*).
Substitution difficulty with Jones and Pörn system
We begin this section by observing that from DLa and (3c), we can derive ¬ p → O¬q ∧ P q which together with (4a) yields
Combine this with (1b) and get O¬q ∧ Op, which yields O( p ∧ ¬q). Since O is a KD modality we get:
• For the Jones and Pörn translation (1b), (2c), (3c) and (4a) to be consistent; p, q must be such that p ∧ ¬q has a model.
This turns out to be a problem for Jones and Pörn . 12 Observe that if we let
we get the fence paradox from (1), (3) and (4). We get 1. Obligatory p becomes Obligatory ¬ fence 2.
[We are not dealing with this item here.] 13 3. ¬ p → Obligatory ¬q becomes fence → Obligatory white fence. 4. ¬ p = fence So if indeed (1)-(4) are independent, then the Jones and Pörn solution must remain consistent, and offer a solution also to the fence paradox under the fence substitution above.
In fact we get a contradiction. From (3c) and (2c) we get (3 c) and (2 c):
From (4a) and (3 c) we get
Since ¬q = ¬p ∧ w we get q = p ∨ ¬w. Thus
12 The difficulty does not apply to Carmo and Jones (2002) , see however Gabbay and Schlechta (2009) which studies their system in detail. 13 Note that white fence implies fence, therefore we have w → ¬p or equivalently p → ¬w. Thus (2) becomes the perfectly acceptable: 2. ¬ f ence → Obligator y¬ f ence.
From the above we get O(¬ p) and from (1b) we get Op, which is a contradiction because O is a KD modality. The reason we can get a contradiction is the reflexivity requirement
We do not get a problem with the Jones and Pörn translation of Chisholm if p ∧ ¬q is consistent, and by symmetry also p ∧ q is consistent. However, if we require this condition then the translation is not independent.
The reflexivity is required so that the translation of Chisholm (3) and (4) implies the translation of (7).
So we have a problem.
More observations about DL
Jones and Pörn define Ought x as Ox ∧ P ¬x. Let us see whether we can improve on this definition. We shall see later that our improvement defends us against the Hansson attack Jones and Pörn (1989) mentioned earlier.
Let x i be all wffs such that u Ought x i hold. Thus each x i holds at all points s such that u R O s, and for each i there is a t i such that u R O t i and t i ¬x i .
Let us say intuitively that x i "uses" t i . This means that if we look at x = i x i then we have u Ox and for each t i , t i ¬x. There may be points t such that u R O t and t x but such points are not relevant to "Ought" since there is no x i such that u Ought x i and x i "uses" t.
We can therefore disconnect t from the accessibility R O and thus have that O x holds for the new relation R * O , where R * O is the result of disconnecting all such ts. Because we disconnected points that are never "used" by Ought, the original Ought x i retain their truth value.
In fact, for all we know, all x i are such that Ox i ∧ O ¬x i holds, are just like for x = x i .
One thing to check: what if one of the unused points t is u itself and we have ¬u R O u but u R O u? We cannot disconnect it because we need u R O u for reflexivity. Answer: Reflexivity is used in the translations (2c) and (3c). We can disconnect u and compensate and write the reflexive closure of (2c), (3c) as (2 * c) and (3 * c).
The above suggests that we give up the reflexivity condition (DLa) and we may define a new Ought * x to be Ox ∧ O ¬x and compensate for reflexivity. So we get
This is a good move compatible with the previous definition of Ought x. The previous definition does allow for Ought * x because Ought * x → Ought x. Let us now see if the Hansson objections carry through. We check whether
The Hansson objections do not carry through. However we still have the objection to reflexivity. The reader might think that Ought * is too strong and might raise other difficulties. To persuade the reader of the value of translating using Ought * let us show that we can defend against the Hansson attack in the original Jones and Pörn system DL itself (with reflexivity), simply by replacing
We need not cancel reflexivity, and thus we can use the original translation (1b), (2c), (3c), (4a).
So we take DL as it is, and just replace Ought by Ought * , and see whether the Hansson objections still work.
Let us check whether ¬ p ∧ Ought Similarly we cannot get the other Hansson objection, namely
For clearly we get u R o u and not u R o u, but for any t such that u R o t, we cannot show that t | ¬ p ∧ ¬q, because all we know about t is that t | ¬ p.
The new Ought * translation does satisfy all the requirements and Jones and Pörn (1989) could have used it to defend against Hansson.
Let us go further and examine what Jones and Pörn (1989) said. They admit that formula (35) below for Ought is unfortunately valid. We can check however that the formula is not valid for Ought * . Thus our remedy works for (35) as well.
For assume u | Ought * p and u | P (¬ p ∧ ¬q). We distinguish two cases. We now add more comments about the Jones and Pörn (1989) rejoinder. As part of their rejoinder to Hansson, Jones and Pörn introduced formula (5), which we call here (16-5) and claimed that this formula cannot be valid unless A is logically true or false.
Their analysis is correct. However, they claim that (Jones and Pörn 1989, p. 431 The authors of the current paper are puzzled by this statement. If we allow dependency between A and B, why not let A = ¬Ought B and get
Ought¬Ought B → ND(Ought B → Ought B).
Let us now check formula (5) of Jones and Pörn Jones and Pörn (1989) for the case of Ought * , which we shall call here (15-5*).
Writing (16-5*) in full gives us (15-5*a):
which is equivalent to:
which is clearly not a theorem of DL.
Giving up reflexivity
The reflexivity condition is (DLa), saying that the actual world is either ideal or subideal. This condition is a matter of opinion. The actual world may be quite miserable and can be neither ideal nor subideal. The real technical reason for reflexivity is the need to do modus ponens between item (4) in Chisholm (i.e. ¬ p) and the corresponding contrary to duty item (3) ¬ p → Obligator y ¬q. If we give up reflexivity we will not have this clause available, and will not be able to detach and get Obligator y ¬q. This is called factual detachment.
If we translate "In fact ¬ p" 
then we need reflexivity to get ¬ p → O¬q ∧ P q and do detachment and get O¬q ∧ P q which is Ought¬q.
If we give up reflexivity we need to change the translation so that we can detach. So let us try to solve this problem for the Jones and Pörn system.
We are given the substitution inconsistency of Sect. 4. We remain with the Jones and Pörn definition of Ought x as Ox ∧ P ¬x. We give up reflexivity i.e. give up (DLa). We are seeking ways to compensate. Consider Fig. 3 According to Fig. 3 we have at point u that Op ∧ P ¬ p holds, i.e. Ought p holds. We do not have reflexivity. In fact, we want our model to be a tree. So definitely we want ¬u R O u and ¬u R O u.
Imagine our actual starting world is s j if (4) is p in Chisholm and our starting world is t i if (4) is ¬ p in the Chisholm set.
Let Y x be a modal operator going backwards. So if R O ∪ R O is a tree, then t Y x iff y x, where y is such that y(R O ∪ R O )t (i.e. y is the predecessor of t).
We now translate the Chisholm set using Y . We use to identify this translation
(3 c) ¬ p → Obligator y ¬q, of Chisholm is translated as
Recall that in Fig. 3 we live at t i which is R O accessible to u. In (1 ) we translate the obligation as holding at u (we put Y (Op ∧ P ¬ p)), but in (2 c) and (3 c) we translate the obligation as "(Ought p)" not as "(Y Ought p)" as we do in (1 ). This means that we take the obligation as holding at s j and t i because we do not put Y in front of the obligation. Had we done this, i.e. translated (3c) as
we would have got our contradiction again as in Sect. 4.
Thus given (1 ), (2 c), (3 c) and (4 ), we will get, see Fig. 3 , that s j O¬q ∧ P q and u O¬ p ∧ P p.
So if ¬q ≡ ¬p ∧ w (the fence example) we do not get a contradiction because we have different worlds.
The perceptive reader might criticize this translation because "Obligator y x" is translated differently in (1 ) and in (2 c) and (3 c). We could translate (2c) and (3c) the same way as we do (1) using Y and take (2 1 c) and (3 1 c). But then how can we avoid the inconsistency of Sect. 4?
The answer is that this can be solved by using two dimensional modal logic which was available in 1985 (see Hansson 1989; Reichenbach 1947 ). The idea is to evaluate formulas with two indices (s, s ) A, and so we can do the following, for example for (3 1 c):
for u the predecessor of s.
This implies Thus we get that Ought p holds at (u, u) and Ought¬q holds at (s, s). Thus in the fence example where ¬q = ¬p ∧ w, we get no contradiction! In fact, Ought¬q holds at the right place, where the violation ¬ p occurs.
Remark 3.1 (Summary of our translation)
We use two dimensional logic 2DL as explained above and formally defined in the next section and we use the translation (1 ), (2 1 ), (3 1 ) and (4 ). This translation will be free of the fence contradiction but will still suffer from the Hansson objections. To defend against Hansson we replace Ought in our two dimensional translation by Ought * and call this translation ( * ). This works as we shall formally show in the next section.
The two dimensional deontic logic 2DL
We now give a formal definition of a two dimensional version of DL, which we call 2DL. This follows the definitions of 2SDL. We are just giving direct definitions for convenience. OP corresponds to the condition
This axiom system needs an additional constant p * . The reason Jones and Pörn needed to enrich the language is that the above condition DLb cannot be axiomatized in the language of O and O alone, using traditional axiom schemas, as the following Lemma of ours shows. (We shall use this lemma later to axiomatize 2DL):
Remark 3.4 (Rantala constants) We shall see later that the idea of having several Rantala constants r 1 , r 2 , . . . is useful in dealing with several parallel Chisholm sets.
When we have the constant p * we do not need two modalities O and O . All we need is one K modality and axiom
We define O and O by:
If we have several Rantala constants r i , i = 1, 2, . . . we can take a K modality with the axioms ♦r i ∧ ♦¬r i and define several Jones-Pörn connectives
Our strategy in proving completeness for 2DL is to show that DL is complete for tree models, thus showing that DL and 2DL are sub-logics of 2SDL and so our completeness theorem for 2SDL does the work.
The reasoning is as follows: First we notice that in the semantics of Definition 2.1, we can change condition 2.3 to become condition 2.3r to make O reflexive, where: 2.3r. (t, s) h O A iff for all s such that s Rs or s = s we have (t, s ) h A.
The axiom corresponding to 2.3r is Ox → x. The same completeness proof works. The logic 2DL can be embedded in the logic 2SDL+ Reflexivity, provided we prove that every model of DL is equivalent to a tree model of DL, and assume therefore that we are working with tree models only. This is the job of Lemma 3.5. Pay special attention to conditions (a2) and (b2) in item (2) of the proof of the Lemma which give the reflexivity. Let h be the assignment defined by ((e 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (e n , x n )) | h q iff x n | h q We now prove Claim 3.6 For any A we have ((e 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (e n , x n )) | h A iff x n | h A Proof By induction on A.
(a) The atomic case and the cases of ¬, ∧, ∨, → clearly hold.
(b) Assume t = ((e 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (e n , x n )) | h PA. Then for some t such that t R o t we have t | h A. By definition there exists a z such that x n R o z, or x n = z such that we have t = t * ((1, z) ) or t = t in the case z = x n . Either way we have x n R o z. By the induction hypothesis we have z | h A and hence x n | h P A. A similar argument holds for the case t | h PA.
We now complete the proof of Lemma 3.5. Suppose DL without axiom O P does not prove A. Then there exists a model (S, R o , R o , u, h) such that u | ¬ A. Construct the tree model (S, R o , R o , ((e, u) ), h). In this model, by Claim 3.6. we have ((e, u)) | ¬ A.
Theorem 3.7 2DL is complete for the proposed semantics.
Proof Follows from Lemma 3.5 and the completeness theorem for 2SDL.
Conclusion
We conclude with two remarks.
Remark 4.1 (Solution using Reactive Semantics) The two dimensional approach is OK for the case of repairing the Jones and Pörn system DL but for the general contrary to duty cases and their paradoxes one really needs to be using modern (2005) technology which was not available in 1985.
We use reactive Kripke semantics Gabbay (2008a,b) , Gabbay and Marcelino (2009) Another point, the reactive technology allows us to accomplish our task without the use of Y by using some other translation (see Gabbay 1976a ).
Since we want to remain using 1985 logic technology we will pursue the two dimensional option. We can also show how to deal with temporal contrary to duties. All the machinery is here! We leave this to a continuation paper.
Remark 4.2 (Questions and answers about 2DL and 2SDL)
Question 1: Does 2DL contain the Jones and Pörn system DL? Answer: Yes, it does.
The models for the Jones and Pörn DL are of the form (S, R O , R O ) and evaluation is at points t ∈ S. We can require the models to be trees-it makes no difference. See next section. 2DL does have the two relations R O and R O . If we map the point t of DL onto the pair (t, t) of 2DL, and map O and O of DL onto OY and O Y of 2DL we get complete correspondence. What is missing is the condition
DL which is not required to hold in 2DL.
However if we define the 2DL necessity
And translate Ought q of DL as [2Ought]q = def[2N ]q ∧ ¬O Y q in 2DL, we get complete correspondence. Question 2: 2SDL contains an additional operator Y , should we hold it against it? Answer: No, it is not a disadvantage because Y is not really an additional modality; it just takes the relation R backwards.
We can prove a theorem that Y can be eliminated. Intuitively, whatever you say by going backwards about a point t, you can go to some earlier backwards point s and say from s the same thing by going forwards. 1. we can model temporal COSs in the system. A unit of time is a constellation of points as in Fig. 1 , a future point is another constellation like Fig. 1 and so on. So when we are at point (t, t) if we go back by using Y we are making consideration about now, but if we go back by using Y Y Y we are talking about temporal previous point. The idea works as long as we do not talk about statements like "ideal worlds not too far in the future". 2. We can easily model chains of embedded COSs. 3. In our language, we can specify explicitly how far into the COS chain an obligation is to be enforced.
We shall deal with these points in a continuation paper.
